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This bachelor thesis aims to establish a relationship between earnings management in 
proximity to debt covenant violation and the presence of litigation risk. Central testable 
concept is Watts and Zimmerman (1990) debt covenant hypothesis according to which 
managers tend to manipulate earnings to reduce the possibility of violation of their 
company’s debt agreement.  This setting allows investigating whether the risk of 
litigation is an effective regulatory mechanism which improves the contracting 
usefulness of accounting numbers and better align the interests between creditors and 
company managers, thus making debt covenants more reliable as monitoring 
mechanisms. Due to inconclusive results, this thesis was unable to establish whether the 
threat of litigation can discipline managerial reporting practices and deter misreporting 
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The Effect of Litigation Risk on Earnings Management in the Proximity to Debt 
Covenant Violation 
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Research question and motivation 
Bank loan agreements include covenants to mitigate agency costs faced by the lender. 
Technical default gives lenders the option of accelerating the loan repayment schedule, 
restricting the availability of credit, or modifying the cost of capital. According to the 
covenant-based hypothesis, firms have incentives to meet debt covenants to avoid a 
technical default. They may use accounting earnings management (AEM), real earnings 
management (REM) or both to do so. Ultimately, the quality of the financial statements, 
portraying the economic performance and condition of the companies, is affected by 
both AEM and REM. It is thus crucial to determine the factors that limit firm’s ability to 
manage earnings, and one of such factors proposed and investigated in the prior 
research is litigation risk. 
 
Contribution 
I will add to the literature on effects of litigation risk on earnings management by 
examining litigation risk as a factor affecting the relation between proximity to debt 
covenant violation and earnings management. I anticipate litigation risk to have a 
restricting effect on the overall (total) level of earnings management (TEM) for firms 
close to a violation or in technical default of their debt covenants. Consistent with 
previous research on relation between proximity to debt covenant violation and earnings 
management I also expect a trade-off between REM and AEM to avoid violation of debt 
covenants in the presence of litigation risk 
 
Hypotheses 
1. Litigation risk reduces total earnings management for firms with substantial debt 
covenant incentives  
2. Firms close to a violation or in technical default of their debt covenant are less likely 
to engage in upward accounting earnings management in the presence of litigation 
risk. 
Institute of Economic Studies  
Bachelor thesis proposal  
 
 
3. Firms close to a violation or in technical default of their debt covenant are more 
likely to engage in real earnings management in the presence of litigation risk. 
 
Methodology 
Following Chung et. al. (2013) I will use abnormal Directors & Officers (D&O) liability 
insurance coverage limits to measure expected litigation risk. 
I will follow procedure by Roychowdhury (2006) to model abnormal discretionary 
expenses, abnormal production costs and abnormal cash flow from operations and 
measure REM as the sum of these three components 
To measure AEM, I will follow the procedure in Kothari et. al. (2005). First, I will 
estimate modified Jones (1991) model discretionary accrual. Then I will match each 
firm in the experimental sample based on two-digit SIC code, year and closest return on 
assets, thus extending and adjusting modified Jones model for performance through 
performance matching. 
To evaluate overall changes in earnings management (TEM), I will combine a measure 
of REM with a measure of AEM. 
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3. Research design, sample and data  
4. Data analysis and empirical results 
5. Summary and conclusions 
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Financial debt covenants are accounting-based limits such as restrictions on a 
company’s leverage, interest coverage, total fixed charges, or net worth. These 
restrictions are set by the company’s lenders to cut the cost of monitoring. These debt-
covenants also assuage the lenders’ fear that the managers might exploit their 
informational advantage to pursue strategies that are not in the best interest of the 
lenders but are in the best interest of the managers and the shareholders (Garleanu and 
Zwiebel, 2009). By design, these debt-covenants are set to function as “trip-wires“. 
Should the debtor trip, the lenders can easily tighten their grip before it is too late.  
 
A violation of a debt covenant is defined as any breach of a covenant of an 
indenture or agreement that exists at the balance sheet date (Nini et al., 2011). Violation 
of debt covenant (i.e. a technical default) gives the creditor the option of accelerating 
the loan repayment schedule, restricting the availability of credit, or modifying the cost 
of capital (Sufi, 2006). It also results in significant declines in future capital investments 
in the company (Chava and Roberts, 2007). These consequences indicate that technical 
default is costly to the companies. Therefore, as with other costly activities, companies 
have incentives to avoid debt covenant violations. Hence, to delay the onset of default 
or to improve their bargaining position in the event of debt renegotiation managers 
engage earnings manipulations in the periods prior to or concurrent with technical 
default (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Dichev and Skinner, 2001). 
 
Another incentive to manage earnings around a debt-covenant violation 
originates from the manager’s compensation contract (Jha, 2013). This contract is 
designed to have the lowest possible agency cost and to address the conflict between the 
bondholders and the shareholders. Usually, the firm first chooses the optimal 
compensation contract based on accounting numbers to minimise agency costs arising 
from the separation of ownership (shareholders) and control (managers). 
 
What makes the earnings management around the debt-covenants the interesting 
question is that the managers have some discretion on how to report their earnings. 
They have such discretion partly because it is impossible to write a contract that 
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eliminates it, and partly because it might be optimal for shareholders to allow managers 
some discretion (Demski et al., 1984). As a consequence, managers manage earnings. 
The reasons for the earnings management can be many, but often the reasons are 
opportunistic. Although earnings management can be in the best interest of the short-
term shareholders, it is usually not in the best interest of the long-term shareholders 
because the earnings management erodes the firm’s long-term value (Hazen, 1991). One 
of the instances where managers are thought to manage earnings upward is to avoid a 
debt-covenant violation because the violation reflects poorly on the competence of the 
senior management and is, to some extent, associated with the removal of top 
management. In the accounting literature, this process of upward earnings management 
to avoid a violation is defined as the “debt-covenant hypothesis” (DeFond and 
Jiambalvo, 1994). However, managing earnings upwards before a violation might not 
always be the best decision. Sometimes, the optimal decision for the managers might be 
to manage their earnings downwards in the period before a violation. For example, 
when the managers know that it is impossible to stave off a violation, they might do so. 
They could also manage earnings strategically in a pre-violation period—either upwards 
or downwards, depending on whether they expect a waiver of the violation or a 
renegotiation of the debt covenant soon after the violation. 
 
One type of earnings manipulations is accounting earnings management 
(hereafter AEM), which involves the use of accounting choices such as accruals. 
According to Dechow et al. (1995), accruals arise from the mismatch in timing of cash 
and economic transactions and can help managers convey value-relevant information 
about the company. Given the discretion allowed in accounting for accruals, managers 
can also use accruals to manipulate reported earnings (Jones, 1991). Such discretion and 
potential for manipulation imply that it tends to be difficult for investors to extract the 
information content embedded in reported accruals.  A different kind of earnings 
management involves changes in real operational or investment activities, real earnings 
management (hereafter REM). These changes represent deviations from otherwise 
optimal business decisions to meet certain earnings thresholds earnings 
(Roychowdhury, 2006). This type of earnings management is perceived as more opaque 
and harder to detect, in part because of the intrinsic information asymmetry about real 
operations between a firm’s managers and its external stakeholders (Cohen and 
Zarowin, 2010). Examples of this type of earnings management include boosting sales 
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through accelerating their timing and/or generating additional unsustainable sales 
through more lenient credit terms or increased price discounts and, thus, increasing the 
current period net income; reporting of lower cost of goods sold through increased 
production to increase current period operating margin; decreases in discretionary 
expenditures including advertising, R&D, and SG&A expenses to reduce operating 
expense, boost current period NI and, possibly, current period CFO (Cohen and 
Zarowin, 2010).  
 
Prior studies indicated the general tendency for companies to rely less on AEM 
and more on REM for accomplishing their earnings management objectives (Graham et 
al. 2004; Franz et al. 2014). This preference can be explained can be explained by the 
benefits presented by REM compared to AEM. While AEM has the advantage of timing 
flexibility: accruals can be manipulated on the last day of the period; it has no direct 
impact on cash flows of the company. REM, on the other hand, can help the company to 
generate cash to meet its unexpected critical needs. An example of such an event would 
be a significant cut back on R&D to meet debt obligations. Lastly, AEM has a reversal 
over time constraint which obliges managers to take into consideration the implication 
of their discretion on current accruals for future earnings. On the other hand, REM is 
less subject to this constraint. 
 
The most common methods of estimating earnings manipulations use either 
AEM, REM or the aggregate of both. However, several papers have recommended 
focussing on one component of earnings, which has the potential to provide more 
precise estimates of discretion (reference). Evidence suggests that revenue manipulation 
is one of the major forms of earnings management. For example, according to Dechow 
and Schrand (2004) over two-thirds of SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement 
Releases they analyzed indicate revenue overstatement, implying that revenue 
manipulation is extremely common. However, the research examining the determinants 
of revenue manipulation is extremely limited. 
 
As investors believe that information related to revenue is value relevant and 
important some industries, such as the internet, have strong incentives for revenue 
manipulation as reported by Bowen et al. (2002). Stubben (2006) discovered that 
growth firms are more prone to exercising discretion to manipulate revenues. His results 
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suggest that companies discretionary revenues as a tool of revenue manipulation to 
exceed market expectations.  
 
The contribution of this thesis to the earnings management literature is the 
following. First, I examine debt covenant violation as an incentive for a specific method 
of earnings management, namely, revenue manipulation and would thus try to shed 
more light on the high frequency of revenue manipulation documented both anecdotally 
and empirically. Second, this thesis adds to the existing literature by examining 
litigation risk as a factor that could limit the availability of accounting flexibility and, 
thus, reduce earnings management for companies with substantial debt covenant 
incentives. 
 
Hopkins (2017) provides evidence that higher litigation risk reduces the risk of 
opportunistic managerial biases in accounting income numbers. This is especially 
important for debt contracting purposes because, as discussed earlier, the prior literature 
shows that managers use accounting discretion opportunistically to avoid debt covenant 
violations (DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994; Dichev and Skinner 2001). Such behaviour 
weakens the purpose of covenants in debt contracts as the accounting signals that 
covenants rely on may not be able to inform the creditors of the underlying health of 
their borrowers. Hence, if the rise in risk of litigation constrains managers’ opportunistic 
accounting discretion in financial statements, then it better aligns the interests between 
creditors and company managers, thus making debt covenants more reliable as 
monitoring mechanisms. 
 
De la Bruslerie and Le Maux (2016) argue that litigation can find its source 
outside of the conflict with shareholders and the domain of security litigation, which is 
generally accepted to define litigation risk (Skinner, 1994; Hopkins, 2017). They argue 
that litigation risk may also stem from the firm’s policies and in its management’s 
operational or strategic decisions and, thus, they define the litigation risk as  “the legal 
or contractual costs linked to any kind of disputes with any kind of stakeholder”. 
Security class action litigation enables shareholders to sue a company for issuing 
misleading financial reports and/or disclosures. The direct costs of litigation are 
substantial - on average about two-thirds of inflicted harm - and are sensitive to the 
level of damages (Shavell and Polinsky, 2012). In addition to the direct costs of out-of-
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court settlements and damages imposed by courts, the market value of the sued 
company often declines because litigation heightens uncertainty, and causes the market 
to question management quality and companies’ health. A $20 million lawsuit against a 
firm can prevent it from raising $100 million in debt or equity to finance its activities. It 
is of note that companies bear the indirect costs of litigation even when the lawsuits are 
eventually dismissed. For example, the case against General Motors alleging 
overproduction and channel-stuffing of inventory was ultimately dismissed but dragged 
on for three years, absorbing managers’ attention, their time and expensive legal 
resources. GM’s stock price declined over 30% as the market learned about the 
inventory issues (General Motors Class Action, 2012). The above can be considered as 
incentives to avoid litigation. Hence, litigation risk is expected to promote greater 
accounting quality. 
 
Since class action litigation typically targets managers issuing misleading reports 
and disclosures one can expect managers of companies with high litigation risk to 
engage more extensively in REM. This is consistent with the evidence in Cohen et al. 
(2007) showing that in response to increased litigation risk after the passage of SOX 
managers switched from accruals to REM.  
 
From the above discussion one can see that while proximity to debt covenant 
violation encourages earnings manipulation, the high threat of litigation, on the other 
hand, deters it. Hence, the research question is: Does litigation risk reduce earnings 
management for companies with substantial debt covenant incentives? 
 
The results of the current thesis indicate that companies in technical default 
engage in higher levels of revenue manipulation compared to non-violation companies. 
This result is consistent with previous research. (Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983; 
Sweeney, 1994; Jha, 2013; Franz et al., 2014). However, this thesis was unable to 
establish whether the threat of litigation can discipline managerial reporting practices 
and deter misreporting for the companies with substantial debt covenant incentives. 
This thesis is organised in the following way. In Section 2 the prior research is 
reviewed, and the motivation behind this thesis is explained. Section 3 provides 
information about the methodology applied and description of the selection of data 
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sample. Section 4 reports the empirical findings of the thesis and Section 5 concludes 
and presents areas for further studies based on the empirical results. 
 
2. Related literature and hypothesis development 
2.1 Earnings management and debt covenants 
 
Mulford & Comiskey (2002) define debt covenants as provisions in credit or 
debt agreements that call for the maintenance of specific amounts and relationships. A 
positive covenant might require the company to maintain an adequate level of 
shareholder’s equity or a minimum ratio of current assets to current liabilities. A 
negative, or restrictive, covenant could require the company to cease or limit the level of 
certain operations, for example, to restrict capital expenditures. Such covenants increase 
the loan repayment rate, as they provide the lender with some degree of control 
allowing to maintain scrutiny over the performance of the borrower Smith (1993).  
 
Smith (1993) finds that the lenders generally set debt constraints just below the 
actual current value. Thus, if the company’s performance does not deteriorate from the 
standard industry level, the debt is serviced as usual. However, in case the company’s 
performance declines, covenants are violated, giving the lender the ability to renegotiate 
the loan. Smith (1993) points out that it is a general practice to reset the constraint to 
just below the current level, which allows the lender to maintains his ability to quickly 
step in if performance continues to decline. If the company's performance improves, the 
debt is serviced as usual. Still, if performance continues to decline, the lender again 
reassesses the loan, and may eventually get to the point where more drastic alternatives 
are necessary. 
 
Gopalakrishnan (1994) specifies the following possible debt covenants: 
Maintenance of minimum working capital, tangible net worth, profitability, quick ratio 
etc; Restrictions on investments and acquisitions, pledging certain assets; Restrictions 
on incurring additional indebtedness; Restrictions on incurring other capital 
expenditures; Restrictions on the ability of the firm to encumber its assets or engage in 




There is substantial evidence that debt covenant violation firms potentially face a 
variety of financial penalties, such as possible acceleration of debt maturity, increase in 
interest rate, renegotiation of debt terms. For example, Beneish and Press (1995) 
document a negative stock price reaction to the announcement of technical default. Core 
and Schrand (1999) find that companies that are close to violating debt covenants 
experience a greater adverse stock price reaction to bad news than do companies that are 
not close to violating covenants. These studies provide evidence that violation of debt 
covenants is costly to companies. 
 
The debt covenants hypothesis developed by Watts and Zimmermann (1990), is 
the major presumption tested by researchers subsequently studying the impact of debt 
covenants on earnings manipulations. Under this hypothesis, managers tend to 
manipulate earnings to reduce the possibility of violation of their company’s debt 
agreement. The strength of these incentives depends on the costs of violating the firm's 
debt covenants, that is, on the costs of technical default (Holthausen and Leftwich, 
1983).  
 
According to Watts and Zimmerman (1990), there is the considerable influence 
of tightness of the covenant constraint on the probability of a covenant violation and of 
incurring costs from technical default. Watts and Zimmerman (1990) believed that 
managers relax debt constrains and reduce the costs of debt covenant violation by 
engaging income increasing earnings manipulations. This hypothesis has been subject to 
the considerable amount of empirical research. Prior research by Sweeney (1994) finds 
evidence that managers take actions to avoid debt covenant violations. Roychowdhury 
(2006) finds that real earnings management is higher for companies with debt than those 
without it and Franz et al. (2014) documented that companies close to debt covenant 
violation exhibit higher REM compared to far from violation ones. Additionally, 
research by Kim et al. (2010) established that level of REM is higher for companies 
when debt covenant slack is tighter. 
 
On the other hand, there is the evidence that managers of financially distressed 
firms are not likely to inflate earnings and portray firms as less troubled to avoid debt 
covenant violations (DeAngelo et al., 1994; Darrough et al., 1998). Even though such 
accounting policies contradict with common sense at first glance, the researchers 
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provide reasonable explanations for the results obtained. For instance, DeAngelo et al. 
(1994) found that managers of financially distressed companies use negative AEM to 
supress the reported earnings even further.  
 
One of the reasons for the controversial evidence is that, in addition to using 
discretionary accruals, companies may also alter their operating and investing decisions 
to achieve earnings objectives. Roychowdhury (2006) finds evidence consistent with 
managers manipulating real activities to avoid reporting losses, and these activities are 
more prevalent for firms with outstanding debt. On the other hand, he neither directly 
investigates real earnings management when companies are close to debt covenant 
violation, nor controls for accrual manipulations. Testing for REM, while controlling for 
AEM, is vital because managers could use REM to complement or to substitute their 
use of AEM. Graham et al.’s (2005) survey report that managers often prefer REM over 
AEM to manage earnings. Cohen and Zarowin (2010) argue that REM is perceived as 
more opaque and harder to detect, in part because of the intrinsic information 
asymmetry about real operations between a firm’s managers and its external 
stakeholders. Furthermore, decisions related to REM occur before decisions related to 
AEM (Zang, 2012). Thus, managers may not be able to reach their earnings 
management objectives using only AEM. This is consistent with the evidence in Franz 
et al. (2013) showing that companies close to a violation of their debt covenants or in 
technical default exhibit higher levels of REM, AEM and total earnings management 
than far from violation companies. 
 
While there exists extensive literature of AEM and REM around debt covenant 
violation, no other researcher has studied explicitly if debt covenant violation acts as an 
incentive for revenue manipulation. I address this issue by testing whether in fear of 
being subject to fines and penalties for non-compliance with debt covenants specified in 
loan agreements, managers of the borrowing firms tend to manipulate revenues. My first 
hypothesis is as follows:  
 





2.2 Litigation risk  
 
The concept of litigation risk has been studied in the fields of law and finance. 
When considering the litigation risk, Francis et al. (1994), refer to the likelihood that the 
company's shareholders will sue it over issues related to financial reporting. According 
to Bhagat and Romano (2005), owners of the companies may ask the judicial system to 
sanction companies and executives for disseminating financial information that does not 
faithfully represent the company’s wealth.  
 
Francis et al. (1994) examine companies’ communication policies, about their 
exposure to litigation risk. They show that companies in sectors exposed to a high 
litigation risk - such as technology, retailing, electronics, and computers - delay the 
announcement of poor financial results, rather than announce them ahead of time. 
 
Litigation risk has been analysed by looking at shareholders’ situation within an 
initial public offering (IPO) framework. According to the litigation risk hypothesis, in 
order to avoid lawsuits IPO companies underprice their new issues. Evidence evidence 
shows that 6% of IPO companies were sued in class action in the period 1988-1995 
(Lowry and Shu, 2002). Such pursuits lead to essential settlements, averaging 10% of 
the IPO proceeds. In addition to the direct costs of out-of-court settlements and damages 
imposed by courts, companies had to bear indirect litigation costs, such as damaged 
reputations. According to the authors, companies with a higher litigation risk underprice 
their IPOs by a more considerable amount as a form of insurance, and that larger 
underpricing lowers expected litigation costs.  
  
In the case of voluntary disclosures and financial reporting, litigation risk has 
been shown to be a powerful disciplining force in addition to governance (Skinner 
1994; Venkataraman et al. 2008; Hopkins 2017). Venkataraman et al. (2008) find that 
audit fees are higher and accruals are lower during the pre-IPO period when issuers face 
strict liability. However, the authors did not reveal how managers respond to litigation 




On the other hand, several studies document that managers respond to litigation 
risk by altering the occurrence, precision, timing and frequency of earnings forecasts 
(Skinner, 1994; Skinner, 1997). However, earnings forecasts are not audited, are not 
likely to be contracted upon, and are generally verified days or weeks later. 
 
 Hopkins (2017) further examines the effect of litigation risk on accounting 
choices reflected in mandatory financial reports. He finds that with the decline of 
litigation risk companies exhibit increased restatement frequency and higher accruals 
management, which is consistent with litigation risk deterring managers from misstating 
financial statements.  
 
However, Hopkins (2017) studied only the perceived benefits of litigation, and 
his paper does not demonstrate that litigation is an efficient regulatory mechanism. To 
address this issue, I test whether litigation risk limits managers ability to exercise 
discretion to relax debt constraints or reduce the costs of technical default. I expect 
litigation risk to improve the contracting usefulness of accounting numbers and better 
align the interests between creditors and company managers, thus making debt 
covenants more reliable as monitoring mechanisms. I hypothesise (in the alternative 
form): 
 
Hypothesis 2: Litigation risk reduces revenue manipulation for firms with substantial 
debt covenant incentives  
 
3. Research Design and sample selection 
3.1. Methodology 
 
Initially, there is a need for estimating discretionary revenues which is 
performed using Stubben (2010) model estimated cross-sectionally based on two-digit 
SIC codes using quarterly data, which controls for industrywide changes in economic 
conditions that affect earnings management while allowing the coefficients to vary over 
time (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994). Afterwards, to test whether litigation risk affects 
earnings management around debt covenant violation the estimate of discretionary 
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revenues is regressed against the measure for litigation risk and a set of control 
variables.  
 
3.1.1 Discretionary revenues 
 
The first step of the analysis derives discretionary revenues. Discretionary 
revenues method is the most broadly accepted method for measurement of revenue 
manipulations in the previous researches. The basic procedure of the method is to use 
regression analysis to identify what the level of accounts receivables would be if the 
manager were not committing any manipulations and any differences from that 
expected level are potentially evidence of revenue manipulations. 
 
This model has been devised by McNichols and Stubben (2008) and Stubben 
(2010). The model provides advantages over other discretionary accrual models because 
discretionary revenues show fewer measurement errors, and revenue manipulation is the 
most common form of earnings management (McNichols 2008; Stubben 2010). 
 
To estimate discretionary revenues this thesis follows the procedure in 
McNichols and Stubben (2008) and Stubben (2010). In line with prior research all 
variables are scaled with average total assets to reduce the heteroscedasticity of 
residuals. Hence, abnormal discretionary revenues (ABREV) are estimated as residuals 
of the following model: 
 
ΔARi,q / Ai,q = β0 + β1*[1 / Ai,q] + β2*[ΔRi,q / Ai,q] + εi,q 
Where 
ΔARi,q = change in accounts receivable for a firm i between quarters q-1 and q; 
Ai,q = average total assets for a firm i from the beginning (q-1) and end of the quarter q; 
ΔRi,q = change in sales revenue for a firm i between quarters q-1 and q; 
εi,q = discretionary revenues for firm i at the end of quarter q. 
 
Following Call et al. (2014), for convenience reasons, the absolute value of 
abnormal discretionary revenues multiplied by 100 is taken so that the higher amount of 




3.1.2 Litigation risk 
 
To study the impact of litigation risk on misreporting, I follow Hopkins (2017) 
and examine changes in discretionary revenues following an exogenous shock to the 
severity of securities class action litigation standards in the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court 
District. The court ruling in Re: Silicon Graphics Inc. Securities Litigation (SGI) issued on 
July 2, 1999, by the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals requires plaintiffs to prove that 
defendants acted with “deliberate recklessness”. This decision substantially increased 
the hurdle for successful litigation against corporations headquartered in this circuit and 
reduced their litigation risk (Pritchard and Sale, 2005). As the shock affected only 
companies situated in U.S. Ninth Circuit Court District, I can compare their post-ruling 
changes in discretionary revenues to those of companies situated in states belonging to 
other circuits in differences-in-differences regression.  
 
My empirical analysis compares the companies headquartered in the U.S. and 
listed on the U.S. stock market in window of three years before (1996-1998) and after 
(2000-2002) the court ruling in Re: Silicon Graphics Inc. Securities Litigation (SGI) 
issued on July 2, 1999, by the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The year of the 
ruling, 1999, is excluded from the analysis.  The sample restriction allows preventing 
possible misinterpretation arising from differences in reporting standards as all the 
companies in the sample are assumed to report under US GAAP. The time-frame 
restriction allows me to avoid the possible effect of confounding events over longer 
horizons. For example, it excludes any effect following the passage of the Sarbanes 
Oxley Act in 2002. 
 
3.1.3 Effects of litigation risk (Empirical model) 
 
The last step of analysis strives to achieve the purpose of the study. To 
investigate the impact of litigation risk on misreporting around a covenant violation, I 
estimate the following quarterly OLS model: 
 
ABREVi,q = β0 + β1Circuit9i + β2Postq + δ0Circuit9i*Postq + β3Violi,q + 
β4Circuit9i*Violi,q + β5Postq*Violi,q + δ1Circuit9i*Postq*Violi,q + β6LEVi,q-1 + β6ROAi,q-1  + 





ABREVi,q = abnormal discretionary revenues for firm i at the end of quarter q; 
Circuit9i = dummy variable that equals to one if firm i is headquartered in one of the Ninth Circuit states 
and zero otherwise; 
Postq = dummy variable that equals to one if firm issued the quarterly report after Ninth Circuit ruling 
(from 2000 to 2002) and zero otherwise (from 1996 to 1998); 
Violi,q = dummy variable that equals to one in the quarter in which a violation occurs and zero otherwise. 
LEVi,q-1 = long-term debt to total assets for a firm i at the beginning of quarter q; 
ROAi,q-1 = returns on assets for a firm i at the beginning of quarter q; 
LnAi,q-1 = natural logarithm of total assets for a firm i at the beginning of quarter q; 
MTBi,q-1 = market-to-book ratio for a firm i at the beginning of quarter q; 
 
The coefficients of interest are δ0, β3, δ1. β3 indicates whether debt covenant 
violation affects revenue manipulation. δ0 and δ1 measure how the decline in litigation 
risk with Ninth Circuit ruling for Ninth Circuit companies affected revenue 
manipulation relative to other companies in general and in the quarters with violation 
respectively. Notably, as U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruling issued on July,1999 
(Post) reduced litigation risk for companies headquartered in Ninth Circuit states (Circuit9) 
δ0 is expected to have a positive sign, as fall of litigation risk is anticipated to provide 
the opportunity for revenue manipulation for those companies.  
 
To control for differences in earnings management incentives, the regression 
equation includes variables of leverage, firm performance, political attention and capital 
market incentives. To control for the effects of leverage on earnings management the 
ratio of long-term debt to total assets (LEV) is included (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; 
Call et al., 2014). Return on assets (ROA) is used to control for firm performance. To 
control for political attention (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990) and capital market 
incentives (Koh, 2003) of misreporting, the model includes variables of size and growth 
opportunities respectively. The Former is proxied by the natural logarithm of total assets 
(LnA), which itself is also a proxy for size of the company. The latter is proxied by the 
market-to-book ratio (MTB).  
 




My final sample consists of 63090 firm-quarters and 5337 firms that span from 
the first quarter of 1996 to the fourth quarter of 2002, excluding 1999. They represent 
the intersection of nonfinancial and non-utilities firms that have the violation data, the 
non-missing data to calculate the discretionary revenues, and the non-missing data for 
the control variables used in the main regression model.  
 
The sample selection is as follows. I start with all nonfinancial and non-utilities 
firms available on Amir Sufi’s website and used in the paper by Nini et al. (2011). This 
data set provides the calendar date of the quarterly filing and an indicator variable that 
shows whether the firm reports a violation of a covenant. It is then matched with the 
Compustat data set to obtain the variables required to calculate the discretionary 
revenues and control variables. In line with earnings management literature, the final 
sample was selected in accordance with the following principles: the sample requires 
that at least 2 observations be available to run industry-quarter regressions; the sample 
excludes companies in financial industries (sic 6000-6999) and utilities (sic 4000-4999), 
because these industries are highly regulated, and company managers may have 
incentives to manage earnings to meet regulatory standards; the sample excludes 
companies with missing data on any of the required for the analysis variables; Specific 
to the thesis research, the sample excludes firms that changed states of headquarters. To 
mitigate the effect of outliers, I winsorize all of the continuous variables at the 1st and 
the 99th percentile. All variables are explained in Appendix 1. 
 
Notably, all the earnings management incentive control variables included are 
calculated for the beginning of each quarter to examine their impact to influence 
managers’ incentives to modify earnings subsequently during the quarter. The table 





Note: Sample consists of 63090 firm-quarters and 5337 firms that span from the first quarter of 1996 to the fourth quarter of 2002, excluding 
1999. Only companies headquartered in the U.S. and listed on the U.S. stock market are considered, thus all figures are assumed to be reported 
under US GAAP. All data (apart form the reported covenant violation) comes from Compustat database. All continuous variables are winsorized 
at the 1st and the 99th percentile. ABREVi,q abnormal discretionary revenues for firm i at the end of quarter q; Circuit9i is the dummy variable 
that equals to one if firm i is headquartered in one of the Ninth Circuit states and zero otherwise; Postq is the dummy variable that equals to one if 
firm issued the quarterly report after Ninth Circuit ruling (from 2000 to 2002) and zero otherwise (from 1996 to 1998); Violi,q is the dummy 
variable that equals to one in the quarter in which a violation occurs and zero otherwise. LEVi,q-1 is the long-term debt to total assets for a firm i at 
the beginning of quarter q; ROAi,q-1 is the returns on assets for a firm i at the beginning of quarter q; LnAi,q-1 is the natural logarithm of total 
assets for a firm i at the beginning of quarter q; MTBi,q-1 is the market-to-book ratio for a firm i at the beginning of quarter q. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the sample (n=63090) 
Variable Min Median Mean Max Std. Error Std. Dev. 
ABREV .0000497 1.317529 2.026896 217.507 .0110913 2.785879 
Circuit9 0 0 .2571247 1 .00174 .4370522 
Post 0 1 .5278491 1 .0019876 .4992278 
Circuit9Post 0 0 .1432715 1 .0013948 .3503523 
Viol 0 0 .0684102 1 .0010051 .2524505 
Circuit9Viol 0 0 .0186083 1 .1351383 .1351383 
PostViol 0 0 .0420669 1 .2007434 .2007434 
Circuit9PostViol 0 0 .0112538 1 .105486 .105486 
LEV 0 .0748249 .1566407 3.650022 .2044693 .2044693 
ROA -51.09655 .0062074 -.0269196 21.66499 .2780643 .2780643 
LnA -1.237874 4.720047 4.904714 13.22766 1.85668 1.856682 




4. Empirical results 
Table 2 provides correlation coefficients among independent variables. The 
intention behind correlation analysis is to identify possible multicollinearity. 
Multicollinearity is referred to as a high correlation among the independent variables of 
the model. According to Anderson et al. (2009), if two independent variables have a 






Note: All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentile. ABREVi,q abnormal discretionary revenues for firm i at the end 
of quarter q; Circuit9i is the dummy variable that equals to one if firm i is headquartered in one of the Ninth Circuit states and zero otherwise; 
Postq is the dummy variable that equals to one if firm issued the quarterly report after Ninth Circuit ruling (from 2000 to 2002) and zero 
otherwise (from 1996 to 1998); Violi,q is the dummy variable that equals to one in the quarter in which a violation occurs and zero otherwise. 
LEVi,q-1 is the long-term debt to total assets for a firm i at the beginning of quarter q; ROAi,q-1 is the returns on assets for a firm i at the beginning 
of quarter q; LnAi,q-1 is the natural logarithm of total assets for a firm i at the beginning of quarter q; MTBi,q-1 is the market-to-book ratio for a 
firm i at the beginning of quarter q. 
Table 2. Correlation between independent variables (n=63090)      
 Circuit9 Post C9Post Viol C9Viol PostViol C9PostViol LEV ROA LnA MTB 
Circuit9 1.00           
Post 0.0346 1.00          
C9Post 0.6951 0.3868 1.00         
Viol 0.0092 0.0473 0.0164 1.00        
C9Viol 0.2341 0.0212 0.1814 0.5081 1.00       
PostViol 0.005 0.1982 0.0743 0.7733 0.386 1.00      
C9PostViol 0.1813 0.1009 0.2609 0.3937 0.7748 0.5091 1.00     
LEV -0.1066 0.005 -0.0717 0.0464 -0.0144 0.0273 -0.0138 1.00    
ROA -0.0347 -0.0448 -0.0458 -0.0252 -0.0215 -0.0235 -0.0215 0.0061 1.00   
LnA -0.071 0.1153 0.0037 -0.0744 -0.0474 -0.0401 -0.0263 0.2724 0.123 1.00  




When multicollinearity exists, the confidence intervals of the coefficients tend to 
become very wide, and the statistics tend to be very small, p-values may be misleading, 
and t-values tend to be too low, leading to lack of significance of independent variables 
(Anderson et al., 2009). Hence, in the presence of multicollinearity, it may become 
difficult to reject the null hypothesis.  A possible solution to the issue would be to 
remove highly correlated variables from the regression equation. Multicollinearity is 
observed between the control variable Circuit9Viol and variable of interest 
Circuit9PostViol (0.7748) as well as between control variable PostViol and variable of 
interest Viol (0.7733). To test whether this affects the significance of the variables of 
interest Viol and Circuit9PostViol the empirical model was run with and without 
Circuit9Viol and PostViol control variables. The empirical results of the original model 





       
Note: Table 3 presents a detailed list of empirical model coefficients and their standard errors.** and * denote coefficients significant at 5% and 
10% respectively. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentile. Circuit9i is the dummy variable that equals to one if 
firm i is headquartered in one of the Ninth Circuit states and zero otherwise; Postq is the dummy variable that equals to one if firm issued the 
quarterly report after Ninth Circuit ruling (from 2000 to 2002) and zero otherwise (from 1996 to 1998); Violi,q is the dummy variable that equals 
to one in the quarter in which a violation occurs and zero otherwise. LEVi,q-1 is the long-term debt to total assets for a firm i at the beginning of 
quarter q; ROAi,q-1 is the returns on assets for a firm i at the beginning of quarter q; LnAi,q-1 is the natural logarithm of total assets for a firm i at 
the beginning of quarter q; MTBi,q-1 is the market-to-book ratio for a firm i at the beginning of quarter q. 
Table 3.  Empirical model results (n=63090) 
Variable Coefficient Standard error 
(Intercept) 2.718841** .0348241 
Circuit9i -.0786266** .0388251 
Postq .0473657* .0266274 
Circuit9iPostq -.0456576 .0525457 
Violi,q .3444655** .0823727 
Circuit9iVioli,q .4309317** .1562052 
PostqVioli,q .047259 .1050477 
Circuit9iPostqVioli,q -.2495949 .2009498 
LEVi,q-1 .0321769 .0564436 
ROAi,q-1 -.2668213** .0400317 
LnAi,q-1 -.1489784** .0063015 
MTBi,q-1 -.0007475 .0005723 
R-squared 0.0135  




Table 3 summarizes the results of a regression of discretionary revenues 
(ABREV) against major influence factors. ABREV are estimated as residuals of 
McNichols and Stubben (2008) and Stubben (2010) model. Out of three factors of 
interest (Circuit9Post, Viol and Circuit9PostViol) only Viol appears to be significant 
(5% level) in explaining DAC. The influence of this factor is positive. Therefore a 
positive effect of Viol on ABREV was found, which is consistent with Hypothesis 1. 
The other factors of interest, Circuit9Post and Circuit9PostViol, have no explanatory 
power over discretionary revenues. Hence, hypotheses that litigation risk reduces 
revenue manipulation for firms with substantial debt covenant incentives (hypothesis 2) 
is not accepted due to lack of sufficient evidence in favour of those hypotheses. 
 
Out of four control variables employed in the empirical model only return on 
assets (ROA) and the natural logarithm of total assets (LnA) were found to be 
significant (both variables are statistically significant at 5% level) in explaining 
discretionary revenues. The influence of both factors is negative implying the reverse 
relationship. Hence, lower return on assets and the lower natural logarithm of total 
assets at the beginning of the quarter both lead to positive revenue manipulation. The 
result is consistent with earlier research (see, e.g., Call et al., 2014; Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1990). For example, LnA proxies for size and political cost and according 
to political cost hypothesis (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990) larger and more profitable 
companies attract more attention of the auditors and governmental bodies. Hence,  to 
lower their political risk companies would have to manage revenues downwards. 
 
To investigate whether the high correlation between Circuit9Viol and 
Circuit9PostViol (0.7748) as well as between PostViol and Viol (0.7733) affects 
regression results an additional regression was performed without factors Circuit9Viol 
and PostViol. Regression without factors Viol and Circuit9PostViol was not performed 
as these are the key interest factors to this thesis. The empirical results of the reduced 





      
Note: Table 4 presents a detailed list of empirical model coefficients and their standard errors.** and * denote coefficients significant at 5% and 
10% respectively. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentile. Circuit9i is the dummy variable that equals to one if 
firm i is headquartered in one of the Ninth Circuit states and zero otherwise; Postq is the dummy variable that equals to one if firm issued the 
quarterly report after Ninth Circuit ruling (from 2000 to 2002) and zero otherwise (from 1996 to 1998); Violi,q is the dummy variable that equals 
to one in the quarter in which a violation occurs and zero otherwise. LEVi,q-1 is the long-term debt to total assets for a firm i at the beginning of 
quarter q; ROAi,q-1 is the returns on assets for a firm i at the beginning of quarter q; LnAi,q-1 is the natural logarithm of total assets for a firm i at 
the beginning of quarter q; MTBi,q-1 is the market-to-book ratio for a firm i at the beginning of quarter q. 
Table 4. Empirical model results excluding Circuit9Viol and PostViol variables (n=63090) 
Variable Coefficient Standard error 
(Intercept) 2.713909** .0346486 
Circuit9i -.0517526 .0376236 
Postq .0488729* .0257725 
Circuit9iPostq -.0698848 .0515782 
Violi,q .4255657** .0480311 
Circuit9iPostqVioli,q .147615 .1182866 
LEVi,q-1 .0301287 .0564364 
ROAi,q-1 -.2670106** .040033 
LnAi,q-1 -.1487733** .0063014 
MTBi,q-1 -.0007489 .0005723 
R-squared 0.0134  







The purpose of this thesis is to investigate whether litigation risk reduces 
earnings management for companies with substantial debt covenant incentives. 
According to Watts and Zimmerman (1990), managers tend to manipulate earnings to 
reduce the possibility of violation of their company’s debt agreement. I try to establish 
whether the risk of litigation is an effective regulatory mechanism which improves the 
contracting usefulness of accounting numbers and better align the interests between 
creditors and company managers, thus making debt covenants more reliable as 
monitoring mechanisms. 
 
A variation of acclaimed Stubben (2010) model is employed in this thesis to 
capture discretionary revenues which were used as a proxy for earnings management. 
The underlying reasons for the focus on one component of earnings rather than an 
aggregate measure were the following: first, it is proven to yield more accurate 
estimates of discretion (Stubben, 2010; Call et al., 2014); Second, it allows to examine 
the effect of debt covenant incentives on revenue manipulations, which has not been 
studied before, and contribute to the investigation of Watts and Zimmerman (1990) debt 
covenant hypothesis, the empirical findings on which are conflicting.  
 
The data on the company’s violations were extracted from Nini et al.’s (2011) 
publicly available comprehensive quarterly dataset of reported covenant violation. 
Litigation risk was captured using “natural experiment”, the exogenous shock from the 
U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruling, which has tightened securities class action 
litigation standards and, thus, reduced litigation risk for companies headquartered in the 
Ninth Circuit District. 
 
The results of the current thesis suggest that the variable under debt covenants 
hypothesis which is Viol appear to be significant in explaining discretionary revenues. 
As expected by the debt covenant hypothesis the relationship is direct. This result is 
consistent with previous research, which was supported by a reasonable explanation 
(Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983; Sweeney, 1994; Jha, 2013; Franz et al., 2014). For 
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instance, Holthausen and Leftwich (1983) argue that the strength of managerial 
incentives to manipulate earnings depends on the costs of violating the firm's debt 
covenants, that is, on the costs of technical default. As a violation of debt covenant 
gives the creditor the option of accelerating the loan repayment schedule, restricting the 
availability of credit, or modifying the cost of capital (Sufi, 2006), as well as results in 
significant declines in future capital investments in the company (Chava and Roberts, 
2007). Hence, to delay the onset of default or to improve their bargaining position in the 
event of debt renegotiation managers engage earnings manipulations. 
 
The results of analysis of litigation risk were inconclusive and, thus, I was 
unable to establish neither whether litigation risk deters revenue manipulation in general 
nor whether it deters revenue manipulation for the companies with significant debt 
covenant incentives.   
 
It is possible to extend this study in a number of ways. As some of the empirical 
results were inconclusive is suggested to employ a different measure of litigation risk to 
test its effect on earnings manipulation around debt covenant violation. This would lift 
the time-frame restriction of the current research. It is also advised to control for other 
earnings management incentives, including, but not limited to: length of the operating 
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Appendix 1: Variable Glossary 
 
Variable Explanation 
Circuit9 Indicator equal to one if the firm is headquartered in one of the 
Ninth Circuit States.  
Post Indicator equal to one for years 2000-2002, and zero for years 
1996-1998  
Viol Indicator equals to one for quarters which a violation occurs and 
zero otherwise; 
LEV Proportion of long-term debt to total assets  
ROA Returns on assets, measured as net income divided by total assets  
MTB Market-to-book ratio 
LnA Natural logarithm of total assets 
ABREV Following McNichols and Stubben (2008) and Stubben (2010), I 
estimate abnormal discretionary revenues as residuals of the 
following model: 
ΔARi,q / Ai,q = β0 + β1*[1 / Ai,q] + β2*[ΔRi,q / Ai,q] + εi,q 
 
ΔAR Change in accounts receivable 
A Average total assets 
ΔR Change in sales revenue 
 
